

Address

by

VADM Stansfield Turner, USN

President, Naval War College

to

Chicago Council

Navy League of the United States

Lake Shore Club

9 March 1973

Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Thank you. Distinguished guests, members of the Chicago Council of the Navy League.

It's a pleasure to be with you tonight and to participate in the annual winter meeting of the Ninth Region's largest Navy League Council.

I want you to know that my visit to Chicago this week is also a real homecoming. I spent my childhood days through graduation from high school in Highland Park. My folks lived here in the area until just recently when Dad retired and they moved to Charlottesville, Va. It's a wonderful opportunity for all of us to get together and to see old friends again and I am grateful to you, the Chicago council, for helping to make it all possible.

I'd like to talk to you today about higher education in the Navy. Obviously, this kind of education is of interest to me, but I think that it is also of interest to all of you. In my opinion, what we are doing in higher naval education mirrors the changes and trends throughout your Navy today.

Let me start by describing what we are attempting to achieve at our highest Naval educational institution, the Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island.

We work at Newport with hand-picked officers at mid-career, largely LCDRS & Cdrs. Most of them come to us with a background of education, experience and training which inculcates in them a view of a rational, Newtonian Universe, one in which there are precise, right and wrong answers for almost every

problem. This is in part because an officer's vocational experience is in an authoritarian chain of command. The obligations of responsibility and authority are to make decisions quickly and correctly. It is in part because we live in a technical environment, one which demands particular skills which can be performed only one way, the right way, not the wrong way.

Now there is nothing wrong with this. We are a very technical service, but what I am suggesting is that as officers move up the ladder, they must be able to deal increasingly with situations like strategy and personnel management that are not simple and direct, are not susceptible to precise right or wrong answers. My job at the Naval War College is to educate people to deal with such issues; to get officers to recognize the subtleties, the uncertainties and the inexactness of the decision process of being a senior naval officer.

Now at the War College we are trying to approach this problem through a new curriculum that we have instituted this year. Let me start by illustrating how we tackle the question of broad national strategy, the issue of what the Navy can contribute in the post-containment era, or multi-polar world, or whatever one calls the new international arrangements that are emerging today.

We have put Strategy into our curriculum through the device of military history. We have asked the students to dissect the decisions of strategists of the past. For instance

we began this year--and it was something of a shock to the students, I must admit--by reading Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars. Now these wars were nearly twenty-five hundred years ago. Many of the students asked, "How in the world can this be relevant to what I am doing in the last part of the twentieth century?"

Well, the wars between Athens and Sparta were wars between a seapower and a landpower; they were wars in which the seapower, Athens, decided to send an expedition across the seas to as far away as Sicily. The expeditionary force became overextended; it became bogged down. The people of Athens refused to continue supporting what was going on so far away from home. The consequences were severe.

The analogies are obvious. So we tried having the officers look at the factors that influenced the decisions of the Athenians and of the Spartans. This made them realize that the issues of whether to send a campaign overseas or not, whether to follow a maritime strategy or a land strategy, are issues that people have grappled with for many years. They are issues that are not easily resolved, but many of the fundamental considerations have not changed all that much, over these years.

Next we looked at other cases of military history: the Napoleonic Wars; our Civil War; the Spanish-American War;

asking questions like: "Were we imperialistic in 1898? Have we been imperialistic since then?"

Now we don't believe that history is going to repeat itself. We do believe that today's officers must be able to cope with the principles behind history and be able to answer questions like, "What does it mean to be moving into a 'Multi-polar' world?" and "Where in this kind of complex situation does the United States fit?"

In truth, there are no precise, easy answers to questions like these. Therefore, what we are trying to do in higher naval education today is to help our mid-career officer students emerge into this world of the social sciences from the precise world of the technical sciences. We want to do this by giving them an experience in intense thinking, in reasoning and logic and familiarity with the historical perspective.

We are emphasizing the thinking process, not the absorption of facts. How do we do this? We do it primarily by making the student think it out for himself. For instance, our students were only required to be on the campus five hours a week during the strategy course. They had two required lectures and a three-hour seminar. Now the rest of the time wasn't exactly leisure. We gave them a thousand pages of military history to read each week. We required them each to write an essay every third week and an examination every fourth. What we were trying to do, though, was to give them

enough latitude to explore many facets of these particular problems; to look at many of the various issues that impinged on the decisions of military leaders in the past. We wanted our students to be forced to do their own digging in their historical case studies. In the future they are going to have to dig out for themselves what lessons are applicable to the particular cases in military decisions that they will be dealing with in 1974 or 1978 or whenever it may be. The facts that are relevant to our strategy today are not likely to remain so, four, five or ten years from now. But the principles, the process of thinking and reasoning will be, and that is what we're trying to get across.

Strategy is not the only thing that we teach. Naval officers today, more than ever before perhaps, are managers. They are continually faced with difficult decisions of choice, because we never have and never will have as much money as we think necessary. They are faced with issues like: if you had a billion dollars in the Navy budget, would you spend it on four nuclear-powered guided missile frigates or on twenty destroyer escorts? Now almost anyone would prefer the nuclear frigates, and there are some situations where we absolutely can not do with less. Nothing less would survive. There are other situations, however, where four or five of those frigates just would not go far enough around. We might have ten or twenty places where they were needed. Obviously we are

going to end up with some compromise, perhaps a mix of two frigates and ten destroyer escorts, or one frigate and fifteen escorts. How do we decide on that mix? It is difficult. Here, again, it is not as precise as solving technical problems such as, how do you put a missile together, or how do you run the engineering plant of a destroyer?

What we are doing is teaching the students to approach these complex problems by first asking, "What is the objective? Why do you want a frigate; why do you want a destroyer escort?" These are very imprecise questions; they are answered much as we do in strategy by looking at the broad ends that we are trying to achieve and making a judgment as to what our objective should be. We are trying to make the students appreciate that setting objectives is an important, but not a precise step that they must take.

Then we go on to the controversial field of analysis and systems analysis. We say that having established an objective, you can use tests, or analytic techniques, to help you to make your choices between the escorts and the frigates or whatever it may be. But then, we caution the student that in the long run, having done the very best analysis and made the very best decision, if you can't get the Congress to buy it, you haven't accomplished a thing. Or if you can't get industry to build it for you at something like the cost that you estimated, you haven't accomplished a thing. How then do you get a decision

executed? It is again, a very imprecise process. It is a matter of judgment; a matter of your feeling for public opinion; your feeling for the state of industry and their attitudes; your feeling for the opinions and rigidities within your own bureaucracy.

So here again, in the management field, what we are attempting to produce in higher Naval education is officers who understand that they must combine the techniques of the physical sciences with which they are familiar and comfortable, with the inexactness and approximation of the social sciences.

Finally, the last part of our curriculum at the War College concerns what we call Tactics. With the diminished size of the military establishment, we must be able to get the very most from every unit that we have. We must employ our forces tactically in the best way possible.

Here, in Tactics, the methodology of the scientific approach is very much with us. After all, in any tactical interaction, there are mathematical estimations that can be made. A radar has a certain range, a certain probability of detection and certain errors that you can anticipate. Theoretically, you can work out quite precisely what to expect under certain circumstances.

There is one hitch of course. Sometimes we do not really know what numbers to put in these mathematical equations. We do not know what the weather is going to be like tomorrow

afternoon; and we are not even sure when the weather is bad what effect this has on the radar. We are not too sure whether the radarman is going to be inattentive tomorrow morning, because he did not get enough sleep, or whether he is going to be highly motivated because he recognizes the importance of what he is doing. Officers must be willing and able to make their own estimates on how well a radarman is going to perform, and combine that with an exact calculation of the characteristics, frequencies, ranges and other details of the radar.

So the tactics part of this course is systematic. It ends up with probabilities, rather than preciseness. There is a probability that under circumstance A you will do well. There is a probability that under circumstance B you will do poorly. You, the tactical commander, must do calculations, using intuition, guesses or whatever to fill in the missing numbers, but somehow you must decide how you are going to play your forces in any given situation.

If we can just teach the students to be systematic and logical in their approach, their guesses will be more than that. We want them to understand that even if tactical choices cannot be calculated precisely, it is a big help to identify your choices explicitly and to know what estimates and guesses you must make.

Now this process of developing leaders who can deal with the uncertainties of Strategy, with the combination of precise

analysis and judgment in Management and with the probabilities of Tactics means several things to us. One is that there will be more emphasis on mid-career War College education in our new Navy. There has been, of course, a marked increase in mid-career executive development programs since World War II. The Harvard Business School was one of the first to move into this field in 1943. Today over 50 universities conduct full time executive development programs. A number of large corporations such as General Electric and Motorola have their own in-house programs. So does the American Management Association, the International Marketing Institute and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Our program in the Navy, though, is placing emphasis on two particular directions that are significant.

First, we are setting truly demanding academic standards and making the student-officer measure up. Our course is, I believe, academically equivalent to the master's degree programs at many of our universities. We require written reports. We test our students with written examinations. We are breaking away from the comfortable tradition that business/military executives at age 40 or thereabouts, are above this sort of thing and should not be subjected to the embarrassment of public competition. As I will explain in a moment, the stakes are too high in my business to be that gentlemanly any longer.

At the same time, I would acknowledge that there are

risks in this new approach. Mid-career student-officers are fiercely competitive. Too much emphasis on measuring their performance could distort their efforts from learning to winning. There is also, frankly, a risk of breaking the spirit of some who cannot make the grade. That might just be viewed as Darwinian in civilian life. In our walk of life we must be careful that we do not by-pass a man of exceptional leadership and fighting qualities, such as a "Bull" Halsey, even if he were not a star in the classroom.

Our second point of emphasis is on deliberately attempting to reshape the habits of thinking of our student-officers. We are not imparting information or updating factual data banks. We inevitably acquaint the student with some new knowledge, but that is a by-product. Reshaping habits of thinking at age 41--the average age in our senior course--is not easy. It is not even a cinch at the average age of 33 in our junior program.

We are debating whether our emphasis should be on the younger or older group. It may be more difficult to get this new approach to take with the over-40's, but if we concentrate on the more malleable men in their 30's, we may not select the right ones. That is, the ones who will rise by their 40's and 50's to positions that truly require this enlarged mental outlook.

More than all this, this whole idea is risky business. Some men may simply lose their bearings in a new world of

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uncertainty and inexactness. We may deprive them of their confidence that there are right answers without developing a competence to cope with uncertainty.

Why are we accepting all of these risks in demanding high academic performance and in attempting to restructure thought processes? In part because we are proud to have been in this mid-career education business at Newport since 1884, 60 years before it began to catch fire in the business world. We are willing to experiment and to see whether new approaches and emphasis are appropriate to the changing times. Whether these may also be appropriate to the business world, I am not qualified to judge. I am persuaded, though, that in the world of the military of the 1970's and 1980's there will be demands for higher intellectual standards and for greater competitiveness. The gentlemanly fraternal spirit is waning. Why?

First, because we in uniform simply must be able to present our case in a more convincing manner to a more sophisticated audience. We are, quite properly, under closer scrutiny today than perhaps ever before. If we do not or can not make our case well, this criticism could possibly lead this country into a repetition of its rejection of military preparedness as in the 1920's and 1930's. Lack of preparedness today would have more serious consequences than it did then. Our position and responsibilities in the world are vastly different. With intercontinental nuclear weapons abroad in the world, the consequences of unpreparedness in that sphere are obvious, and

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500280001-7

they spill over into the other military areas.

Moreover, it seems to me that the peace time balance of military forces has greater impact on world events than in days past. Modern weapons present an image of swiftness. Other nations look to what we could do for them today, not just what we could do after a long period of mobilization.

Although it places an increased burden on us, we in military uniform should be pleased at the increased attention and interest today in what we are doing. It is forcing us into the hard thinking which will enable us to answer our critics in comprehensible terms. It is forcing us to define explicitly what we need in order to achieve whatever the nation sets as goals for deterrence through preparedness. It is forcing us not to ask for 2 airplanes or 2 ships or 2 tanks when one would have sufficed, lest in a loss of credibility we get none. I welcome this increasing interest in and awareness of our military purposes and requirements. This is one of the factors that is forcing us to develop officers who are articulate rational thinkers, men who will think through our broad military purposes clearly rather than rely on cliches; who will prepare to deter the next war rather than the last; and who will ask only for hardware that we need not what technology can produce.

What size and shape of military forces we require in the 1970's is not for me to say. It is for you, the citizens of the country, through the Congress, to determine. But, there is

great responsibility on military leaders today to present the military picture lucidly, lest you make your decision based on only one side of the equation. It is from this that my feeling comes that we must be more demanding in cultivating the intellectual capacity of our naval leaders of tomorrow.

I am excited about this prospect. I am excited about today's Navy, and the future of the Navy. I think that it is more stimulating and challenging than when I came in. I see it growing increasingly that way. I know that with the support of citizens like you, we will find and we will develop the leadership that will keep your Navy and your country strong and safe!

Thank you.

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Thank you.

C H I C A G O

8-10 March

Thursday, 8 March

1300	Depart for Boston Logan Airport
1515	Depart for Chicago
1640	Arrive Chicago met by Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Conrad. Go to Admiral's Lounge, American Airlines, for brief visit
1700	Depart for Lake Shore Club 850 Lake Shore Drive
1745	(about) Arrive Lake Shore Club
	Evening free

Friday, 9 March

0800	Breakfast with Chuck Mount, Chicago Tribune (interview)
	Prof Marshall Reavis arrives
0930	Depart for WGN Continental Broadcasting
1000	Visit WGN
1045	Depart for Sengstacke Publications Chicago DEFENDER.
1115	Visit Mr. Lewis E. Martin, Chicago DEFENDER and Sengstacke Publications 2400 S. Michigan
1145	Depart for Exchange National Bank 130 S. LaSalle
1215	Arrive Exchange National Bank. Luncheon hosted by Mr. Samuel W. Sax, President.
1330	Return to Lake Shore Club

1515 Depart for Tribune Towers

1530 Meet with Lloyd Wendt, Editor, CHICAGO
TODAY and his editorial board 400 N.
Michigan

1615 Meet with Chicago TRIBUNE Editorial
Board

1700 Depart for Lake Shore Club
850 Lake Shore Drive

1715 Arrive Lake Shore Club

1830 Navy League Din-er (*press coverage)

Receiving line
Dinner
Program (presentation of awards)
*Speech (will be covered by media)

2200 (about) Conclude evening

Saturday, 10 March

1300 Depart Lake Shore Club for O'Hare.

1425 Depart Chicago

HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE NAVY

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INTEREST TO ALL OF YOU

MIRRORS THE CHANGES AND TRENDS

WE WORK WITH MID CAREER - LCDR/CDR

BACKGROUND OF EDUCATIONAL ~~EXPERIENCE~~ ^{TECHNICAL}

AUTHORITARIAN CHAIN OF COMMAND

~~TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT~~

~~EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE~~

TRAINING OUT IN THE FLEET - ~~PRECISE~~

OK ~~NOT CRITICIZING~~ ^{NEWTONIAN}

~~TECHNICAL SERVICE~~

~~TRAINING SYSTEM OUTSTANDING~~

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SUGGESTING AS OFFICERS MOVE UP THE LADDER

LIKE STRATEGY AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

①
Speech
File

1/10/73
Chicago
3/12/73

TO AREAS

VLT GET OFFICERS TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBTLETIES, THE UNCERTAINTIES, THE
INEXACTNESS OF THE DECISION PROCESS

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NEW CURRICULUM

START BY DISCUSSING STRATEGY

~~STRATEGY~~

DEVICE OF MILITARY HISTORY

DISSECT DECISIONS OF STRATEGISTS OF THE PAST

VLT THUCYDIDES'

"HOW IN THE WORLD CAN THEY BE RELEVANT TO
TWENTIETH CENTURY?"

WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA

ANALOGIES ARE OBVIOUS

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WHETHER TO FOLLOW A MARITIME STRATEGY

What attempting to show - issues

GRAPPLED WITH FOR MANY YEARS

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FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED

(3)

~~LOOKED AT OTHER CASES OF MILITARY HISTORY~~

DON'T BELIEVE THAT HISTORY IS GOING TO REPEAT ITSELF

OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO COPE

QUESTIONS LIKE, "WHAT IS CALLED A 'MULTIPOLAR' WORLD?"

NO EASY ANSWERS

MID-CAREER OFFICER STUDENTS WHO ARE EMERGING INTO THIS WORLD
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

EXPERIENCE IN INTENSE THINKING

REASONING

LOGIC

THINKING PROCESS, NOT FACTUAL ABSORPTION

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THINK IT OUT FOR HIMSELF

FIVE HOURS A WEEK

*Using history
to cause understanding
of essential
change - want prepare
students for
change*

THOUSAND PAGES

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GIVE THEM ENOUGH LATITUDE TO EXPLORE

FORCED TO DO THE DIGGING

FUTURE THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DIG

FACTS NOT LIKELY TO REMAIN SO

BUT THE PRINCIPLES

THE PROCESS OF THINKING AND REASONING WILL

MORE THAN EVER BEFORE MANAGERS

DECISIONS OF CHOICE

BILLION DOLLARS

SDE ²⁰DLBN

~~5-12-70~~

24 12

HOW DO WE DECIDE ON THAT MIX?

NOT AS PRECISE AS SOLVING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

APPROACH THESE COMPLEX PROBLEMS BY FIRST LOOKING AT, "WHAT IS

THE OBJECTIVE?

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XI THEN CONTROVERSIAL FIELD OF ANALYSIS

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TESTS, OR ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES, TO HELP

CAUTION THE STUDENT

MADE THE VERY BEST DECISION

CONGRESS

BUREAUCRACY

INDUSTRY

MATTER OF JUDGMENT *NOT PRECISION*

FEELING FOR PUBLIC OPINION;

FEELING FOR THE STATE OF INDUSTRY

XII WHAT ATTEMPTING TO PRODUCE *in MIA. 280001-7*

OFFICERS COMBINE THE TECHNIQUES OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

INEXACTNESS AND APPROXIMATION

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SOCIAL SCIENCES

XIV

LAST PART OF OUR CURRICULUM

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TACTICS

METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

MATHEMATICAL ESTIMATIONS CAN BE MADE

THERE IS A HITCH OF COURSE

DO NOT KNOW WHAT NUMBERS TO PUT IN

WEATHER

RADARMAN

XV

COMBINE THE TECHNIQUES OF PRECISE CALCULATION WITH APPROXIMATE ANALYSIS

TACTICS

IS SYSTEMATIC

ENDS UP WITH PROBABILITIES, RATHER THAN PRECISENESS

CIRCUMSTANCE A

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CIRCUMSTANCE B

TEACH THE STUDENTS TO BE SYSTEMATIC AND LOGICAL

GUESSES WILL BE MORE THAN THAT

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~~XX~~ MORE EMPHASIS ON MID-CAREER WAR COLLEGE EDUCATION

INCREASE IN MID-CAREER EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL IN 1943

50 UNIVERSITIES RUN FULL TIME PROGRAMS

CORPORATIONS AS GENERAL ELECTRIC

MOTOROLA

AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

INTERNATIONAL MARKETING INSTITUTE

THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

TWO EMPHASES

~~XX~~ 1. TRULY DEMANDING ACADEMIC STANDARDS

LESS TRAINING - MORE EDUCATION
EQUIVALENT TO THE MASTER'S PROGRAMS

WRITTEN REPORTS AND TESTS

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*Legislation to change of
content - changes in
style*

7

COMFORTABLE TRADITION

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EXECUTIVES AT AGE 40 ABOVE THIS SORT OF THING

STAKES ARE TOO HIGH TO BE THAT GENTLEMANLY ANY LONGER

~~XV~~ RISKS IN THIS NEW APPROACH

MUCH EMPHASIS ON MEASURING THEIR PERFORMANCE COULD DISTORT
LEARNING TO WINNING

RISK OF BREAKING THE SPIRIT

~~XII~~ SECOND EMPHASIS

DELIBERATELY ATTEMPTING TO RESHAPE THE HABITS OF THINKING

AT AGE 41 IS NOT EASY

DEBATING

YOUNGER OR OLDER GROUP

~~XI~~ WHOLE IDEA IS RISKY BUSINESS

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LOSE THEIR BEARINGS IN A NEW WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY AND INEXACTNESS

8

~~XXI~~ WHY ACCEPTING ALL OF THESE RISKS

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PROUD TO HAVE BEEN IN THE MID-CAREER EDUCATION BUSINESS SINCE 1884

WILLING TO EXPERIMENT

WORLD OF THE MILITARY OF THE 1970'S

DEMANDS FOR HIGHER INTELLECTUAL STANDARDS

GREATER COMPETITIVENESS

WHY?

~~XXII~~ MUST BE ABLE TO PRESENT OUR CASE IN A MORE CONVINCING MANNER
CLOSER SCRUTINY

FAILURE TO MAKE CASE COULD EVEN LEAD

INTO A REPETITION OF ITS REJECTION OF ~~THINGS~~

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS ~~OF THE~~ 1920'S AND 1930'S

MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES

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POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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10

PEACE TIME BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES

~~XXIII~~ INCREASED BURDEN, BUT WE IN MILITARY UNIFORM SHOULD BE PLEASED
ATTENTION AND INTEREST

HARD THINKING ANSWER OUR CRITICS

IN COMPREHENSIBLE TERMS

FORCE US NOT TO ASK FOR 2 AIRPLANES

WELCOME THIS INCREASING INTEREST

~~XXIV~~ FORCING US TO DEVELOP OFFICERS WHO ARE ARTICULATE
RATIONAL THINKERS

THINK THROUGH-MILITARY PURPOSES-RATHER THAN ON CLICHES

PREPARE TO DETER THE NEXT WAR

ASK ONLY FOR HARDWARE THAT WE NEED
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(11)

SIZE/SHAPE MILITARY NOT FOR ME TO SAY

YOU, CITIZENS THROUGH CONGRESS

GREAT RESPONSIBILITY ON MIL ~~FOR LOGIC~~
PICTURE LUCIDLY

BEST MAKE DECISION ONE SIDE
~~PICTURE~~
EQUATION

FROM THIS MY FEELING ... MORE DEMANDING
CULTIVATING INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY

NAVAL LEADERS OF TOMORROW

XXVI

EXCITED ABOUT THIS PROSPECT

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MORE STIMULATING AND CHALLENGING

CONFIDENT

FIND

INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP

KEEP YOUR NAVY AND YOUR COUNTRY, STRONG AND SAFE!

H. Messing

NY. DEPT. USNA ALUMNI
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Speech 1
File

THAT MY FUTURE WOULD INCLUDE

WHAT ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH *AT USC*

MIRROR

WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE

TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING ONE TODAY

MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF 450

DESTINED TOP LEADERSHIP

COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE

VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

AUTHORITARIAN WORLD

PROPER

BUT MOVING UP

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OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP

(CONCEPT OF THINKING) ABOUT THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - ^{MUST} GRAPPLE -
WHETHER ~~OUR~~ WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS

FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS

SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS - TECH CHANGING

← COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES

UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT &
LOSS STATEMENT

New # 3

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SLOW³ DOWN

WHEN SAY DO NOT HAVE A VERY PRECISE OBJECTIVE, I MEAN CANNOT ESTABLISH
PRECISE BASIC OBJECTIVES - NATURE BUSINESS

1. WHY A MILITARY?
2. HOW TRANSLATE NATIONAL GOALS?
3. WHAT INTERPLAY STATE & DOD?
4. WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY?

QUESTIONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A
CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S NEED

→ ~~SECONDLY, STRESS IMPRECISENESS OUR WORLD~~ ALSO DIFFICULTY
IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE

BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER,
RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT

WE LACK SUCH TOOLS

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NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS

ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & ~~to~~

MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT

WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR

NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN - *long time*

ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - *real impact*

← TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED

FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES *realities*

ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - *1.2%*

READINESS FOR ACTION ALONG THE SOVIET-CHINESE PERIPHERY

ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA
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LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS

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6
SLOW DOWN

DEBATE NOT BE BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF

NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & ←

OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY

DEBATE ON POINT INBETWEEN

POINT WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES

← CAN BRACKET START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS

HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE

NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME - ~~NO PRESENCE~~

AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN PROLONGED AMBIGUOUS GROUND WAR IN ASIA

CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE INBETWEEN

SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY

SYSTEMS

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JUDGMENT ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING
THIS EXPLICITLY

SLOW DOWN

WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -
WORLD ENVIRONMENT

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD

START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES

ERA OF A BI-POLAR FOCUS - *ABERRATION*

NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE

BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT

MUST HAVE POWER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE

INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,

ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY

COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER

IF PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR PROVIDE
NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT

SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING

IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING - ~~IN TERMS WINNING BATTLEFIELD~~ MORE WAYS

UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN INFLUENCE THEIR

DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS

OTHER WORDS

A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES

MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS VIRTUES OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S

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WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE - QUICK
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED

SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT

PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY, POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC FORCES

WHAT POLITICAL NEEDS ARE - SOMETHING THAT WE IN UNIFORM CAN NOT
AND SHOULD NOT DETERMINE

CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES

MILITARY ARE SERVANTS

Our role - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE NATION SELECTS
PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY

ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

~~X~~ Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500280001-7

10
SLOW DOWN

INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP

TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE

DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL CHARACTER - WILL

NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL

THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH TO MILITARY MATTERS

← DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS ✓

EXTRAVAGANT DISINTEREST - DISMAY

→ END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING

SET OF OBJECTIVES 180° - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION

MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY

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DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF ^{public} YOUR CONCERN

^{GIVING} IN SHORT SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT

IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED AS THE NATIONAL
WILL DICTATES

← STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU

LOCATING CONSENSUS ON MILITARY PURPOSE ^{we} REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE

THIS DEMANDS HIGHER AND MORE FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES

RISKS ^{OF} IN ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES

DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

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¹²
SLOW DOWN

SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTIONS
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT

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